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INTRODUCTION 
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act [H.R. 4173] (“The Act” or 
“Dodd-Frank”).1 The Act became effective July 22, 2010.2 In the wake of the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress sought to reform 
the regulatory environment of U.S. financial markets.3 The Act, among other 
things, amended the most fundamental term in all of securities law, the 
definition of “security.”4 However, with respect to security-based swaps, 
Dodd-Frank only amended the definition of “security” under the Securities 
Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”).5 By inserting the term “security-based swap” into each 
statute’s definition, Congress unambiguously brought credit default swaps 
under their regulatory regimes.6 Yet, Congress did not amend the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) to include the term “security-based 
swap,” nor did it similarly amend the Investment Company Act of 1940.7 
Thus, whether a credit default swap based on an underlying debt security is 
itself a “security” for purposes of these latter statutes remains an open ques-
tion. Accordingly, this Article explores the application of the definition of 
“security” in the Advisers Act to such swaps by: (1) investigating the role the 
definition of “security” plays in the definition of “investment adviser” and 
subsequent application of section 206 of the Advisers Act; (2) examining 
possible textual bases for concluding that credit default swaps are “securities” 
under the Advisers Act; and (3) arguing why clearer Congressional intent 
is not necessary to define a credit default swap as a “security” under the 
Advisers Act. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court long ago held that, under the Advisers Act, an 
investment adviser is a fiduciary.8 The purpose of the Advisers Act, among 
other things, “was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business 
                                                                                                                         
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. §§ 761(a)(2), 768(a)(1). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. §§769–770. 
8See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). 
2015] SUPERIOR SUPEREROGATION 239 
ethics in the securities industry.”9 In promulgating the Advisers Act, Con-
gress found that “investment advisers could not completely perform their 
basic function—furnishing to clients on a personal basis competent, unbiased, 
and continuous advice regarding the sound management of their invest-
ments—unless all conflicts of interest between the investment counsel and 
the client were removed.”10 Accordingly, the more specific purpose of the 
Advisers Act was to prohibit any practice that operates as a fraud or deceit 
upon any client or prospective client, and to eliminate conflicts of interest 
between the investment adviser and the client.11 To enforce this tenet, Con-
gress provided the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC,” 
“Agency,” or “Commission”) with section 206 of the Advisers Act, the cen-
tral antifraud provision of the statute.12 However, section 206 is inapposite 
if there is no jurisdictional basis for its invocation. Accordingly, the remain-
der of this Article seeks to address this jurisdictional question by exploring 
whether a person is subject to section 206 of the Advisers Act if he or she 
solely renders advice regarding credit default swaps. 
To charge a firm with violating section 206 of the Advisers Act, it must 
meet the definition of “investment adviser.”13 Section 206 states that “it shall 
be unlawful for any investment adviser” to engage in the transactions 
described in section 206(1)–(4), which establishes that being an invest-
ment adviser is a condition precedent to violating section 206.14 An in-
vestment adviser is: 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising 
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value 
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, 
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities ….15 
                                                                                                                         
9Id. at 186. 
10Id. at 187 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 28 (1939) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
11See id. at 191–92. 
12 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §206, 15 U.S.C. §80b-6 (2012). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). Though not relevant here, the Act makes certain 
exclusions from the definition of “investment adviser.” In general, and subject to 
certain conditions, any bank, bank holding company, lawyer, accountant, engineer, 
teacher, broker-dealer, publisher, adviser with respect to government guaranteed securities, 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization, family office, or such other persons not 
within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and regulations 
or order, are excluded from the definition. See id.§80b-2(a)(11)(A)–(H). 
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Accordingly, a firm would meet the definition of “investment adviser” if 
it: (1) was engaged in the business of advising others; (2) on securities; and 
(3) was compensated for such advice. Since the financial crisis of 2008,16 
the SEC has investigated firms that design and execute an investment strat-
egy on behalf of a pooled investment vehicle, the main purpose of which 
is to purchase or sell credit default swaps (“CDSs”).17 In exchange for exe-
cuting this investment strategy, the fund pays the firm a management fee 
based on total assets under management.18 The key fact pattern at issue here 
is one where, besides the CDSs, the firm is not engaged in advising the fund 
on any other financial instrument. Under these facts, firms are receiving 
fee-based compensation for being engaged in the business of advising funds 
on selling CDSs. Thus, they have satisfied the business and compensation 
elements of the definition of “investment adviser.” Therefore, whether such 
a firm meets the definition of “investment adviser” turns upon whether the 
CDSs in question meet the definition of “security” under section 202(a)(18) 
of the Advisers Act. 
Whether a CDS meets the definition of “security” under the Advisers Act 
is a novel question of law. The term “credit default swap” does not appear in 
the definition of “security” under the Advisers Act: 
“Security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a 
certificate of deposit) or on any group or index of securities (including 
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities 
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt 
for, guaranty of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of 
the foregoing.19 
                                                                                                                         
16 Also known as the “Great Recession.” See Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman, Fed. 
Reserve Bd., Testimony at a Conference Sponsored by the Swedish Ministry of Finance, 
Stockholm, Sweden, The Great Recession: Moving Ahead (Aug. 11, 2014). 
17 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release 
No. 9493, 2013 WL 6503674 (Dec. 12, 2013); In re UBS Securities LLC, Exchange Act 
Release No. 3643, 2013 WL 3992459 (Aug. 6, 2013). 
18 SEC, Investment Advisors: What You Need to Know Before Choosing One, http:// 
www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/invadvisers.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
1915 U.S.C.§80b-2(a)(18). 
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A CDS is a credit derivative,20 and more specifically, it is a type of swap. 
Unlike some other terms commonly associated with derivatives regulated 
by the SEC, such as put, call, straddle, option, and privilege, the term “swap” 
does not appear in the Advisers Act’s definition of “security,” despite its 
inclusion in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.21 Moreover, federal 
courts have not addressed the status of CDSs as securities under the Ad-
visers Act in any significant way. Thus, jurists must interpret the text of 
section 202(a)(18). 
II. ANALYSIS 
Certain CDSs are “securities” within the meaning of section 202(a)(18) 
of the Advisers Act.22 In every case involving construction of a statute, the 
starting point is the language itself.23 Accordingly, there are two theories 
rooted in the text of section 202(a)(18) which support defining certain 
CDSs as “securities.” First, CDSs are the equivalent of an option, and are 
thus covered by the options language of the statute.24 Alternatively, CDSs 
are evidences of indebtedness.25 Both theories have their merits and are 
analyzed below. 
A.  Options Clause 
Most convincingly, Congress has adopted the position that a security-
based CDS is the equivalent of an option, and is therefore a security by 
virtue of the options language contained in section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers 
Act. The definition of “security” in the Advisers Act is unambiguous and 
contains the following “derivatives clause”26: “‘Security’ means any ... put, 
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a certificate of 
deposit) or on any group or index of securities (including any interest 
therein or based on the value thereof) ….”27 
                                                                                                                         
20JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 86–87 (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009). 
21 See 15 U.S.C. §§77b(a)(1),78c(a)(10) (2012). 
22 See 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(18). 
23Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
24 See infra Part II.A. 
25 See infra Part II.B. 
26It does not appear that any other authority refers to this clause as the “derivatives 
clause” or “options clause.” See generally An Act to Clarify the Jurisdiction of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Definition of Security, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 
(1982); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-626(I) (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2780; 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-626(II) (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2792. 
2715 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(18). 
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Significantly, when Congress passed Dodd-Frank, it adopted the position 
that swaps, including CDSs, are the equivalent of options: 
In general ... the term “swap” means any agreement, contract, or 
transaction ... that is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option of 
any kind that is for the purchase or sale, or based on the value, of 1 or 
more ... securities ... including any agreement, contract, or transaction 
commonly known as ... a credit default swap.28 
Furthermore, the Advisers Act incorporates this definition by reference 
in section 202(a)(29)29 of the Advisers Act.30 Thus, Congress believes that 
security-based CDSs are the equivalent of security-based options, and 
because it is well settled that the latter is a “security,” so too is the former. 
To explain further, the options clause was inserted into the federal se-
curities laws to clarify, inter alia, the SEC’s plenary jurisdiction over security-
-based options.31 On this point, the Second Circuit has held that options on 
underlying securities are themselves securities.32 Thus, since Dodd-Frank 
clarified that CDSs were a specialized type of option, a security-based CDS 
is a security-based option and therefore a security. 
What is more, the same argument can be articulated in a slightly different 
way: a CDS is a derivative. As discussed above, the term option appears in 
what can be said to be the derivatives clause of the definition of “security.” 
Derivatives may be traded on an exchange (“exchange traded”) or negotiated 
between private parties (“over the counter” or “OTC”).33 Depending on 
the underlying asset, some derivatives meet the definition of “security.” 
Thus, they are “covered derivatives.”34 Covered derivatives are financial 
instruments that derive value from the securities on which they are based.35 
                                                                                                                         
28 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
721(a)(21), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(B)(x) (2012) 
(excluding security-based swaps from the definition of “swap”). 
29The Advisers Act contains a scrivenerಬs error where a second subparagraph (29) 
appears after subparagraph (30) instead of being codified as subparagraph (31). See 15 
U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(29) (2012). 
30 See also 15 U.S.C. §§77b(a)(17), 78c(a)(69), 80a-2(54) (2012). 
31See An Act to Clarify the Jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Definition of Security, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 97-626(I) (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2780; H.R. REP. NO. 97-626(II) 
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2792. 
32 See Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 325–27 (2d Cir. 2002). 
33 COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80. 
34 The term “covered derivatives” is used to identify those derivatives under the jurisdiction 
of the federal securities laws. 
35 See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies, Release No. 29776, 101 
SEC Docket 3523, 2011 WL 3855065 at *2 & n.3 (2011) (concept release) (“Derivatives 
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The underlying asset may be a particular stock, a stock index, or a fixed-
income security such as a bond.36 Derivatives provide opportunities to 
speculate in the financial markets, as well as to hedge a position in the under-
lying asset.37 For example, stock options are derivatives.38 An option contract 
on stock is also a “security.”39 Hence, a stock option is a covered derivative. 
A swap is another type of derivative.40 It is a negotiated arrangement 
between two parties in which each promises to make a payment to the other, 
with the payments occurring at different times and determined under different 
formulas.41 As mentioned above, the underlying asset of a derivative may 
be a fixed-income security.42 These instruments are credit derivatives.43 
The CDS is the most common type of credit derivative.44 Simply put, “the 
credit default swap is an unregulated form of insurance against default.”45 
The buyer of the contract is seeking credit protection against a fixed-income 
security, typically a bond.46 This protection is provided by the seller of the 
swap.47 The seller is known as the long counterparty, and the buyer is known as 
the short counterparty.48 The arrangement enables the buyer of a swap 
contract to transfer the risk of default on the bond to the seller of the swap 
contract.49 Finally, the short counterparty is not required to hold the underly-
ing referenced asset; that is, the short counterparty can take a synthetic posi-
tion on the underlying asset.50 Thus, a security-based CDS is a “security” 
                                                                                                                         
may be broadly described as instruments or contracts whose value is based upon, or derived 
from, some other asset or metric (referred to as the ‘underlier,’ ‘underlying,’ or ‘reference 
asset’).”); see also id. at *6 & n.41. 
36COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80. 
37Id. 
38Id.; see also Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 324–27 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that options and synthetic options are securities when their value is derived from 
an underlying security). 
39COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80. 
40 Id. 
41Id. Swap payments are calculated on the basis of hypothetical quantities of the 
underlying asset referred to as “notionals.” Id. at 81 (quoting Romano, A Thumbnail 
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1996)). 
42 Id. at 80. 
43Release No. 29776, supra note 35, at *6 & n.41. 
44 COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 87 (recognizing that swaps were not securities with 
respect to registration and reporting requirements, but stating significant reforms will likely 
lead to redefining credit default swaps as securities under all provisions of the securities laws). 
45Id. at 86. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. at 81. 
49Id. at 86. 
50 Id. at 81. 
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within the meaning of the derivatives clause because it is, at the very least, 
a “privilege” deriving its value from a security. 
Two cogent arguments flow from the same clause in section 202(a)(18) 
of the Advisers Act, each leading to the same conclusion: a CDS is structured 
as a derivative.51 As noted above, certain CDSs can be security-based.52 It is 
well understood that when a derivative is based on an underlying security, 
that is, based on the value thereof, the derivative itself is a security. As stated 
in Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., options on underlying securities are them-
selves securities.53 Further, Caiola stands for the broader proposition that 
synthetic positions based on securities are themselves securities.54 
Even without Dodd-Frank’s clarification of the swap definition, the 
options clause is a sufficient textual basis for defining security-based CDSs 
as securities because they are the economic equivalent of an option. When 
searching for the meaning and scope of the word “security,” the emphasis 
should be on economic reality.55 This conclusion is significant for two rea-
sons. First, the Commission may be compelled to take a position on 
pre-Dodd-Frank conduct. Second, it applies a consistent ex ante and ex post 
interpretation of the options clause relative to the passage of Dodd-Frank. 
More than being the economic equivalent of an option, CDSs are the 
economic equivalent of a put. Recall that section 202(a)(18) states that 
the term “security” includes “any put” based on the value of a security.56 
The holder of a put contract has the right to receive a contractually agreed 
upon amount as long as the underlying security’s value falls below the strike 
price.57 Similarly, the holder of a CDS has the right to receive the par 
value of the referenced debt security on the occurrence of a negative credit 
event.58 Typically, such a credit event is default. Default has the obvious 
effect of driving a bond’s value to zero. In both instances, the holder of the 
contract has essentially purchased protection against a decline in the value 
of the underlying asset. In the first instance, it is well understood that the 
                                                                                                                         
51 COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 86. 
52 See infra Part II.A. 
53See 295 F.3d 312, 325–27 (2d Cir. 2002). 
54 Id. at 315–16 (“A synthetic transaction is typically a contractual agreement between 
two counterparties, usually an investor and a bank, that seeks to economically replicate the 
ownership and physical trading of shares and options.”). 
55 See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (quoting 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)). 
56 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(18) (2012). 
57 Understanding Stock Options at 6, CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, http:// 
www.cboe.com/learncenter/pdf/understanding.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
58 Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to Approach the 
Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 729 (2008). 
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put contract is a security.59 In the latter, the economics are no different, 
and it is well settled that courts will look through form to substance to find 
a security.60 Furthermore, some master agreements treat separate CDS trans-
actions as a series of annually settled contingent put options issued by the 
seller to the buyer, a contractual representation in harmony with the eco-
nomic reality of the instrument itself.61 Thus, a security-based CDS is a 
security by virtue of the derivatives clause. 
At bottom, Congress found in section 721 of Dodd-Frank that CDSs are 
options.62 Therefore, when CDSs are security-based, they are the economic 
and statutory equivalent of security-based options. Moreover, in 1982, 
Congress inserted the options clause in the Advisers Act, making it clear that 
security-based options were securities and subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.63 
Thus, security-based CDSs are securities by virtue of the derivatives clause. 
B.  Evidence of Indebtedness 
Alternatively, it may be perfectly reasonable to argue that a CDS is an 
evidence of indebtedness. An “evidence of indebtedness” is “an obligation 
to pay in the future for consideration presently received,” and the term is not 
“limited to notes or other acknowledgment of debt.”64 In a swap,65 each party 
agrees to pay an amount in the future in exchange for the other party’s 
                                                                                                                         
59 See, e.g., id. at 729–32; see generally Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d 
Cir. 2002). 
60See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 
494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (embracing economic reality); Caiola, 295 F.3d at 325–26. 
61In practice, this author has reviewed documents between counterparties that were 
based on swap contracts published by the International Swap Dealers Association. These 
contracts represented the credit default swaps as “put options.” Thus, if market 
participants consider security-based credit default swaps to be options, then, in the 
absence of clear Congressional intent, so should the courts and the SEC. 
62 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§721(a)(47), 124 Stat. 1376, 1666 (2010) § 721(a)(47). 
63 15 U.S.C. §80b–2(a)(18) (2012). 
64 Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,128 (Apr. 27, 1979) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271) (discussing the status of reverse repurchase agreements, 
firm commitment agreements, and standby commitment agreements as “senior securities”
under section 18 of the Investment Company Act. Although Release No. 10,666 limits 
its evidence of indebtedness conclusions to section 18, it defines the term “evidence of 
indebtedness”under section 2(a)(36). See also Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment 
Companies, Release No. 29776, supra note 35, at *20 & n.57 (Aug. 31, 2011) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271) (concept release). 
65Here, the Article turns to using the broader term “swap” in lieu of “credit default swap”
as a matter of doctrinal discretion and soundness. 
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promise to pay another amount in the future.66 Each party’s promise to pay 
is legally enforceable under the written agreement between the parties.67 A 
swap, therefore, falls within the meaning of an evidence of indebtedness 
and would therefore be a “security” under the Advisers Act.68 
Although the evidence of indebtedness theory would apply to all swaps 
regardless of their underlying references, it is important to note that the theory 
is doctrinally cabined to security-based swaps. Like options, CDSs can be 
security-based and nonsecurity-based. Accordingly, the analytical approach 
must be faithful to the jurisdictional divide between the SEC and the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) intended by Congress.69 
To determine whether an evidence of indebtedness is a security, it should 
be evaluated under the Reves test.70 In 1990 the Supreme Court adopted 
the four-factor family resemblance test to judge whether notes are securities.71 
First, if the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business 
enterprise or to finance substantial investments, and the buyer is interested 
primarily in the profit the instrument is expected to generate, the instrument 
is likely to be a “security.”72 Second, if the instrument is one in which there is 
common trading for speculation or investment, the instrument is likely to be 
a “security.”73 Third, if the investing public reasonably expects the instrument 
to be a security, the instrument is likely to be a “security.”74 Finally, if there 
is no other alternate regulatory regime that significantly reduces the risk of 
the instrument, the instrument is likely to be a “security.”75 
First, consider a security-based swap. Such a swap would be a security 
because: (1) the sellers use the proceeds for general business purposes and the 
buyers expect to profit from their purchase; (2) there is a market for investment 
and speculation in security-based swaps; (3) as with options, the investing 
                                                                                                                         
66 COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80. 
67 Id. 
68 Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666, supra note 64, at 128–31 (saying that a 
swap is structurally the equivalent of two related forward contracts). Additionally, Release 
No. 10,666 and 29,776 were both written with respect to the Investment Company Act of 
1940. Here, the analysis is being penned with respect to the Advisers Act, but would likely be 
just as applicable to the Investment Company Act. 
69See Further Definition of Swap, Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-67, 453, 2012 WL 2927796 (July 18, 2012); see generally, Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §929-Z, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010), 15 U.S.C. §78o (2012). 
70See Aiena v. Olsen, 69 F. Supp. 2d 521, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
71See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (interpreting the Exchange Act). 
72See id. at 66–67. 
73 See id. at 66. 
74See id. at 66–67. 
75 See id. at 67. 
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public would reasonably expect that a swap based on a security is itself a 
security; and (4) there is no other regulatory regime which significantly reduces 
the risk associated with a security-based swap.76 Thus, a security-based swap, 
as evidence of indebtedness, is a security. 
On the other hand, the Commission would not be able to extend its 
jurisdiction to nonsecurity-based swaps even though they would still be evi-
dences of indebtedness.77 If there is no other alternate regulatory regime that 
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, the instrument is likely to be 
a “security.”78 Essentially, the question is whether there is a regulatory void 
with respect to nonsecurity-based CDSs. Courts tend to allow an agency to fill 
statutory voids, but where there is none, the agency may go out to the four 
corners of the statute and no further.79 One of the benefits of the evidence of 
indebtedness analysis is that it would be applicable to all credit default swaps 
without regard to the referenced asset; that is, it would sweep in nonsecu-
rity-based CDSs. Nevertheless, there is an alternative regulatory framework 
under the CFTC’s jurisdiction to deal with all nonsecurity-based CDSs.80 
Accordingly, the broad definition of “swap” in the Commodity Exchange 
Act brings all nonsecurity-based swaps under the CFTC’s jurisdiction.81 
Thus, the fourth Reves factor is a dispositive limitation on the evidence of 
indebtedness theory, cabining the SEC’s jurisdiction to security-based swaps 
with respect to the Advisers Act.82 
C.  Statutory Construction 
Certainly, if Congress’s intent is clear, then there is no need to engage in 
elaborate textual analysis to determine whether a CDS is a security under the 
Advisers Act. If Congress stated that security-based swaps were securities 
by inserting “security-based swap” in the definition of “security” in the fed-
eral securities laws, then there would not be a need for scholarship on the 
issue. However, Congress did insert “security-based swap” in the defini-
tion of “security,” but only in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.83 
                                                                                                                         
76 Applying the Reves test to security based swaps. 
77 See Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, supra note 69. 
78See Reves, 494 U.S. at 67. 
79See Local 705, Intಬl Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569–70 (1979). 
80See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)(9)–(12), (47) (2012); see also Commodity Futures Trade 
Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9338 at 85 (July 18, 2012). 
81 See 7 U.S.C. §1(a)(47). 
82This analysis may be just as applicable to the Investment Company Act. 
83 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 768(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C.A. §77b(a)(1) (West 2014)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, 
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Curiously, Congress chose not to insert “security-based swap” in section 
202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act, nor did it insert the term in section 2(a)(36) 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940.84 Some commenters may point 
to this fact as an intentional omission, arguing that when Congress had the 
chance in Dodd-Frank to amend the Advisers Act and the Investment Com-
pany Act, it chose not to because Congress did not believe security-based 
swaps, such as CDSs, should be “securities” under these statutes. This argu-
ment lacks an appreciation of history. 
Where the meaning of a statute is in doubt, similar statutes may be 
construed in light of one another under the canon of statutory construction, 
in pari materia.85 “[A]ll acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if 
they were one law.”86 “Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they 
relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or 
have the same purpose or object.”87 In short, statutes are considered in pari 
materia when they deal with precisely the same subject matter.88 However, 
“[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”89 
Generally, the federal securities statutes were enacted for the same 
fundamental purpose, to promote the highest standard of ethics in the securi-
ties industry.90 Yet, certain provisions, though similar across the securities 
statutes, serve different purposes. The precise purpose of the definition of 
“security” in the Advisers Act is to determine when a person or entity meets 
the definition of “investment adviser,” and is thereby subject to the act’s juris-
diction.91 Significantly, a unique purpose of the act was to impose a federal 
fiduciary duty on investment advisers.92 Thus, the purpose of the definition 
                                                                                                                         
§ 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b(a)(10) (West 2014)) 
(“security”defined, in part, as a “security-based swap”). 
84 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, § 202(a)(18), 54 Stat. 847 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(a)(18) (West 2014)); Investment Company 
Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, §2(a)(36), 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 
80a-2(a)(36) (West 2014)). 
85 United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940); see also United States v. Freeman, 
44 U.S. 556 (1845). 
86Stewart, 311 U.S. at 64. 
87United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 466 (6th Cir. 2010); see also United States 
v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1553 (2d Cir. 1989). 
88See Stewart, 311 U.S. at 64. 
89Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 & n.9 (1984). 
90 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
91 See Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(11) (West 2014) (requiring that a person 
or entity must give advice with respect to a “security” to meet the definition of 
“investment adviser”). 
92See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–92. 
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of “security” under the Advisers Act is to determine when the fiduciary 
relationship created by the act should be imposed. By contrast, the same defi-
nition in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act determines when a finan-
cial instrument and its issuer is subject to the registration, reporting, and 
disclosure purposes of those statutes.93 Because their definitions serve the 
same purpose, the courts read the Securities Act and the Exchange Act in 
pari materia.94 However, section 202(a)(18) is not to be read in pari materia 
with section 2(a)(1)95 and Section 3(a)(10) because it is unambiguous on 
its face and serves a different purpose.96 Therefore, section 202(a)(18) is to 
be interpreted in isolation from the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. 
D.  Supererogation 
The doctrine of supererogation supports the conclusion that a CDS is a 
security under the Advisers Act. Despite being very similar to the Advisers 
Act’s definition, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act both now contain 
the term “security-based swap”97 in their definitions of “security.”98 However, 
it was only recently that Congress amended these statutes to expressly include 
security-based swaps in their definitions of “security.”99 Significantly, from 
                                                                                                                         
93See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (stating purpose of Securities 
Act); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (stating purpose of Exchange Act). 
94 See Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 
1066 (10th Cir. 1976); Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 843 
(2d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 
see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 561 n.11 (1982) (reserving the question 
whether a financial instrument can be a security under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 and not under the Securities Act or Exchange Act). 
95Notably, because section17(a) of the Securities Act and section 206 of the Advisers 
Act serve the same purpose of prohibiting fraud, they have been read in pari materia. See 
Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1143 (5th Cir. 1979). 
96See SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
97Title III of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA“), “Legal 
Certainty for Swap Agreements,” § 301(a) added § 206A(a)(3) to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (“GLBA”), which defined a CDS as a swap agreement. Section 301 went on to add § 
206B to the GLBA, which defined a security-based swap agreement as a swap agreement 
whose value is based on an underlying security. Section 301(b) then states that the term 
“security” under subsection (a) had the same meaning as in the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act. Therefore, security-based CDS is a security-based swap and these terms will be 
used interchangeably in this memo. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit.3, § 301(a)–(b), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§§1-27f (2012)); see also Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, supra note 69, at 220. 
98SeeSecurities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I,, § 2(a)(1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 77b(a)(1) (West 2014)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, § 3(a)(10), 48 
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(a)(10) (West 2014)). 
99See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, tit. VII, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 761, 768, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
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2000 to 2010, Congress exempted security-based swaps from the definition 
of “security” under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.100 Neverthe-
less, today, a CDS referencing an underlying security such as a residential 
mortgage-backed security would be a security-based swap for purposes of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.101 
Accordingly, this gives rise to a two part inquiry: (1) whether the 
exemption from 2000 to 2010 should be imputed to the Advisers Act for that 
same time period; and (2) whether the failure of Congress to amend the Ad-
visers Act to include the term “security-based swap” precludes CDSs from 
meeting the definition of “security” under the statute. As explained below, 
both are answered in the negative. 
Importantly, Congress never intended to limit the scope of the defini-
tion of “security” under the Advisers Act.102 Rather, Congress exempted 
security-based swaps, and therefore security-based CDSs, from the definition 
of “security” under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act when it en-
acted the CFMA.103 Yet, Congress expressly preserved the SEC’s antifraud 
enforcement authority with respect to such swaps.104 Significantly, Congress 
reserved the question of whether a swap is a “security” in the savings clause 
of section 304 of the CFMA, stating: “[n]othing in this Act or the amend-
ments made by this Act shall be construed as finding or implying that any 
swap agreement is or is not a security for any purpose under the securities 
laws.”105 
Subsequently, Dodd-Frank unwound the CFMA’s narrow exemption 
and added the term “security-based swap” in the definition of “security” in 
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.106 Additionally, the SEC issued a 
rule under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, which defined security-
based CDSs as securities.107 Neither the CFMA nor Dodd-Frank affected 
                                                                                                                         
100See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 
tit.3, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§1-27f); see also id. 
101See Public Offerings of Investment Contracts Providing for the Acquisition, Sale or 
Servicing of Mortgages or Deeds of Trust, Securities Act Release No. 33-3892 (Jan. 31, 
1958) (enumerating eleven factors to consider when determining whether a mortgage note 
is a security). 
102 See Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(18) (West 2014). 
103 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app.E, 
tit.3, 114 Stat. 2763 (providing “Legal Certainty for Swap Agreements”). 
104See Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 327 (2d Cir. 2002). 
105 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 304, 114 
Stat. 2763. 
106 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, tit. VII, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§761, 768, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010). 
107 See Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, supra note 69, at 220 (July 18, 2012). 
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the treatment of security-based swaps under the Advisers Act.108 Given this 
legislative history, traditional canons of statutory construction should be 
used to construe the definition of “security” under the Advisers Act. 
Fundamentally, when the CFMA exempted security-based swaps from 
the definition of “security” under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, 
while simultaneously preserving the SEC’s enforcement authority over such 
swaps, Congress only intended to exempt security-based swaps from the 
disclosure purposes of those acts.109 Further, Congress punted the question 
of whether a security-based CDS is a “security” in the savings clause of 
the CFMA, leaving the Advisers Act free to interpret a security-based 
CDS as a “security.”110 Subsequently, when Dodd-Frank inserted the term 
“security-based swap” in section 2(a)(1) and section 3(a)(10), omitting the 
same in section 202(a)(18), it was an act of supererogation.111 There already 
existed enough language in section 2(a)(1) and section 3(a)(10) to define a 
security-based CDS as a “security,” through the derivatives clause.112 In 
Tcherepnin, the Supreme Court found that omissions, such as not amend-
ing the Advisers Act to include “security-based swap,” have no controlling 
significance.113 Thus, with respect to the Advisers Act, it was unnecessary 
to put back what was never taken away. By altering the treatment of secu-
rity-based swaps under the CFMA and Dodd-Frank, Congress did not 
intend to affect when a person or entity was subject to the fiduciary duties 
imposed on investment advisers.114 Therefore, as stated above, we need 
only look to the text of section 202(a)(18) to find support for defining a 
security-based CDS as a security. 
                                                                                                                         
108 Compare Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
114 Stat. 2763, with 124 Stat. 1376, 1871. 
109 See Caiola, 295 F.3d at 327. 
110 Compare Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
114 Stat. 2763 with 124 Stat. 1376, 1871. 
111 See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 n.30 (1967) (“the exemption from 
registration for insurance policies was clearly supererogation”); SEC v. Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 74 n.4 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
112 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 2014); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A § 78b(a)(10) (West 2014). 
113 See Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 344. 
114Where Congress inserts a provision in only one of two statutes that deal with a closely 
related subject, courts construe the omission as deliberate. See In re Fed. Mogul Global Inc., 
684 F.3d 355, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that Congress acts intentionally and purposely 
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion). Additionally, because the purpose of an amendment 
is to change the act being amended, courts should pause before reading statutes in pari 
materia where an amendment is involved. See NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE 
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §51:3 (7th ed. 2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether a security-based CDS is a “security” under the Advisers Act is a 
novel question of law. As demonstrated, a security-based CDS is a “security” 
by virtue of the “options clause” or the “evidence of indebtedness” language 
of section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act. Furthermore, by appreciating 
the history of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine of supererogation neatly justifies Congress’ decision to pen 
“security-based swap” into those statutes’ definition of “security.” Thus, 
when a firm is engaged in the business of providing advice on security-based 
CDSs for compensation, it meets the definition of “investment adviser” 
under the Advisers Act. 
